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On a very intuitive way of  thinking, if  it is already determined that some event will  happen, then 
there is no non-trivial chance (no chance between 0 and 1) of  it failing to happen, and if  it is 
already determined that some event will not happen, then there is no non-trivial chance of  it 
happening.1 On this way of  thinking, it does not make sense to claim both that it is already 
determined that Always Dreaming will win this year’s Kentucky Derby and that the chance of  
Classic Empire winning instead is 1/2.
Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly common for philosophers to claim that there are 
non-trivial chances in worlds where the fundamental dynamical laws are deterministic.2 In such 
worlds, for any event e, at any time t, it is already (at t) either determined that e will happen or 
determined that e will not happen. But, according to these philosophers, there are at least some 
cases in such worlds where the chance (at t) of  e happening is between 0 and 1. Call the chances 
that are supposed to exist in such worlds deterministic chances, and the philosophers who think that 
they do in fact exist compatibilists about chance and determinism, or just compatibilists.
This entry surveys some arguments that motivate compatibilists (section 1), with a focus 
on arguments that begin from the various roles that probabilities play in deterministic scientific 
theories—scientific theories with deterministic fundamental laws. I then discuss the extent to 
which deterministic chances, as established by such arguments, are compatible with existing 
metaphysical analyses of  chance and with various pre-theoretic platitudes about the chance 
concept (section 2).
Before we begin, a note about terminology. Most discussions of  chance begin by claiming 
that chances are objective probabilities. But what is meant by ‘objective’ in this definition is not 
always clear. In what follows, I will assume that chances are objective probabilities in the sense 
that they are wholly determined by the world as it is independently of  us and our epistemic 
position within that world. Chances, in other words, do not depend in on the sorts of  beliefs and 
evidence that we have about the world, the types of  creatures that we are, and the ways in which 
1 Lewis 1980, 1986; Popper 1982; Hajek 1996; Schaffer 2007.




It is widely accepted that whatever chances are, they are to be contrasted with individual 
credences (the degrees of  belief  of  some particular agent). And indeed the above way of  
understanding ‘objective’ captures this result. But—and this is more controversial—it also follows 
from the above way of  understanding ‘objective’ that rational credences (the degrees of  belief  some 
agent should have) also do not count as genuine chances. While the degrees of  belief  that an agent 
should have will of  course depend on what the world is like, they will also depend, at least in part, 
on the evidence that agent has, the sort of  creature she is, and the kind of  reasoning she is 
capable of  engaging in. It will depend, in other words, on the epistemic position she occupies.4 
In what follows, I will assume that in order to establish compatibilism about chance and 
determinism one must do more than establish that there are rational credences or evidential 
probabilities in worlds where the fundamental laws are deterministic. Compatibilism requires 
that we establish that there are probabilities that are wholly objective, in the sense described 
above, in such worlds. This assumption will play an important role in the discussion of  arguments 
for compatibilism in the next section.
1 The case for deterministic chance
Why be a compatibilist? The type of  argument I will focus on is this: 
1 Non-trivial probabilities play role R in theory T (according to which the 
fundamental laws are deterministic).
2 In order to play role R, the probabilities in question must be objective.
It follows from these two premises that there are chances in (at least some) worlds where the 
fundamental laws are deterministic (namely those worlds in which theory T is true).
The two deterministic theories that are most frequently discussed by compatibilists are 
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics.5 I focus on versions of  the above 
schema involving these two theories in sections 1.1 and 1.2 below. In section 1.3, I will briefly 
gesture toward a somewhat different, but importantly similar sort of  argument for compatibilism.
3 Note that this understanding of  ‘objective’ may need to be modified insofar as one is interested in objective 
probabilities of  various doxastic states or epistemic positions. I set such worries aside.
4 A more difficult question is whether evidential probabilities—the degree to which the evidence available from a 
certain epistemic position supports some proposition—are genuine chances. It will depend on what one means by 
evidence and whether the evidence available from a certain epistemic position depends on the nature of  the agent 
that occupies it.
5 For a more detailed treatment of  Boltzmannian statistical mechanics see chapter 7a in the present volume, and for 
a more detailed treatment of  Bohmian mechanics see chapter 4d.
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1.1 Deterministic chance in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics
According to classical statistical mechanics, the fundamental laws are Newtonian and thus 
deterministic.6 Given a complete specification of  the initial state of  a statistical mechanical 
system (i.e. given a complete specification of  the position and momentum of  each particle in the 
system at the inital time), those laws determine the behavior of  that system at all other times. 
A relatively standard Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics7 adds to these 
fundamental laws a probabilistic postulate. For R an arbitrary region of  phase space and r an 
arbitrary subregion of  R, the rule says:
The Boltzmannian statistical postulate. The probability that a system starts off  in r, 
given that it starts off  in R, is just the measure (on the Liouville measure) of  the 
points within R that are also within r. 
Where the Liouville measure is the measure that is uniform over phase space with respect to 
position and momentum.8
The Boltzmannian statistical postulate allows us to predict the microstate of  a statistical 
mechanical system on the basis of  its macrostate. Consider a gas enclosed in a box. There are 
ways of  arranging the particles of  the gas such that the gas is concentrated in one corner of  the 
box. But—loosely speaking—there are far more ways of  arranging the particles such that the gas 
is roughly evenly distributed throughout the box. (More carefully, if  B is the region of  phase 
space that corresponds to the initial macrostate of  the box, the measure (on the Liouville 
measure) of  the points within B that correspond to the gas being concentrated in the corner is 
very small compared to the measure of  the points within B that correspond to the gas being 
roughly evenly distributed.) So the Boltzmannian statistical postulate tells us that it is very likely 
that the initial state of  the gas is such that it is roughly evenly distributed throughout the box.
The Boltzmannian statistical postulate, combined with the fundamental laws, also allows 
us to predict the behavior of  a statistical mechanical system over time, given only a specification 
of  its macrostate. For R1 and R2 arbitrary regions of  phase space, it follows from the 
Boltzmannian statistical postulate that the probability that a system that starts off  in R1 will 
evolve into R2 is just the measure (on the standard Lebesgue measure) of  the points in R1 that 
evolve into R2 according to the fundamental dynamical laws. Let H be the region of  phase space 
6 Pace the concerns in Earman 1986 and Norton 2008. For further discussion see chapter 11b of  this volume. 
7 Boltzmann argued for different approaches to statistical mechanics at different times in his career (see chapter 7a in 
the present volume), and interpretations of  each of  the various approaches differ.  As is relatively standard in the 
literature on deterministic chance, I will focus specifically on the Boltzmannian approach as spelled out in detail in 
Albert 2000. For a discussion of  probability in other versions of  classical statistical mechanics see Sklar 1995. 
8 As discussed in Uffink 2017, 4.1, a measure that is uniform over phase space with respect to energy generates a 
probabilistic rules that makes incorrect predictions.
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that corresponds to the initial macrostate of  a gas that starts off  confined to one half  of  an empty 
box. There are points within H that lead to the gas remaining concentrated in that half  of  the 
box, or even contracting to occupy a smaller volume. But the measure of  such points is tiny 
compared to the measure of  the points within H that lead to the gas expanding to occupy the 
available volume. It follows from the Boltzmannian statistical postulate that it is extremely likely 
that the gas will expand to occupy the available volume.
Of  particular note is that fact that the Boltzmannian statistical postulate allows us to 
predict the data that was previously predicted by the second law of  thermodynamics. It allows us 
to predict the fact that we rarely observe anti-entropic behavior—behavior in which a closed (or 
nearly-closed) system evolves from a higher entropy state into a lower entropy state. Within any 
non-gerrymandered region of  phase space—including those regions that correspond to the sorts 
of  largely isolated, macrophysical systems that we interact with on any everyday basis—the 
measure (on the Liouville measure) of  the points within that region will evolve into regions that 
correspond to an increase in the system’s entropy is tiny. It follows from this fact, combined with 
the Boltzmannian statistical postulate, that it is extremely unlikely that we will observe anti-
entropic behavior.
It is tempting to think that what has been said so far about the role that the Boltzmannian 
statistical postulate plays in generating predictions is sufficient to support an argument for 
compatibilism along the following lines:
3 Non-trivial probabilities determine what we ought to expect to happen in 
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics.
4 In order to determine what we ought to expect to happen, the probabilities in 
question must be objective.
But one should tread carefully here. Although premise 3 is uncontroversial, the plausibility of  
premise 4 depends crucially on what is meant by ‘objective’. In particular, it is not clear that in 
order to determine what we ought to expect to happen, the probabilities need to be wholly 
objective in the sense described in the introduction. At least on the face of  it, rational degrees of  
belief  are good candidates for determining what we ought to expect to happen. And, as was 
argued in the introduction, rational degrees of  belief  are not wholly objective probabilities.
For this reason it is important to recognize that most philosophers who argue for 
compatibilism on the bases of  the role that probabilities play in Boltzmannian statistical 
mechanics emphasize that the Boltzmannian statistical postulate does not only play an important 
role in generating predictions—it also plays a crucial explanatory role.9  
Consider again the fact that we rarely observe anti-entropic behavior. Insofar as one 
9 See for instance Albert 2000, Goldstein 2001, Loewer 2001, Meacham 2005, Lyon 2007, North 2010, Emery 
2015.
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considers just the fundamental dynamical laws of  classical statistical mechanics, the absence of  
anti-entropic behavior is surprising. Those laws, after all, are time-reversal invariant—if  it is 
nomologically possible for a system to evolve from state S1 to state S2, it is also possible for the 
system to evolve from S2 to S1. So if  it is nomologically possible for a statistical mechanical 
system to evolve from a lower entropy state to a higher entropy state—as indeed it is; we observe 
such behavior all the time—then it is also possible for such a system to evolve from a higher 
entropy state into a lower one. So why don’t we ever observe the latter sort of  behavior? the 
Boltzmannian statistical postulate gives us a straightforward answer to this question: we don’t ever 
observe such behavior because, although it is possible, it is extremely unlikely.
This further explanatory role gives rise to an argument for compatibilism based on the 
following premises.
5 Non-trivial probabilities explain relative frequencies in Boltzmannian statistical 
mechanics.
6 In order to explain these relative frequencies, the probabilities in question must be 
objective.
This argument, at first glance at least, is substantially stronger than an argument based on 
premises 3 and 4. First, notice that premise 6 is uncontroversial. It is one of  the most basic 
assumptions that we make about the world that nothing about the evidence that we as inquirers 
have about the world, or about the types of  creatures that we are and the ways in which we 
reason plays a role in explaining the behavior of  statistical mechanical systems. Insofar as there 
are probabilistic explanations of  statistical mechanical phenomena, therefore, the probabilities 
involved must be objective.
As for premise 5, some philosophers who are resistant to the idea of  deterministic chances 
point out that there are alternative explanations available for the explananda in question. Perhaps 
most obviously, one can explain the lack of  anti-entropic behavior in any particular system simply 
by pointing to the exact microphysical state that system started in, combined with the 
fundamental laws.10 But it is clearly part of  standard scientific practice both historically and 
today to use probabilistic explanations of  the sort described by premise 5.11 If  nothing else, that 
ought to make acceptance of  premise 5 the default view. 
10 See Schaffer 2007 and Frigg 2008 p. 680  for explicit endorsements of  this alternative strategy. A different way of  
providing an alternative explanation is to explain the behavior directly in terms of  facts about the measure as in 
Maudlin’s (2007a) typicality account.
11 This assertion is found in Albert 2000, Loewer 2001, Meacham 2005, North 2010, and elsewhere. See Strevens 
2000 for an argument that the explanatory power of  the probabilities found in, e.g. Boltzmann’s rule, is required in 
order to explain the adoption of  statistical mechanics over rival theories in the late 19th century., It is perhaps also 
worth noting that using probabilities to explain relative frequencies in the way suggested by premise 5 is utterly 
prosaic. Think, for instance, of  how natural it is to answer the question, “why don’t we ever see a fair coin land heads 
100 times in a row?” by pointing out that it is extremely unlikely for that sequence of  flips to occur.
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The two arguments set out above are not the only ways of  constructing an argument from 
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics that appeals to some version of  premises 1 and 2. Other 
reasons for thinking that the probabilities generated by the Boltzmannian statistical postulate are 
genuinely objective may include the role that probabilities play: (i) in determining the truth (or 
assertibility) conditions of  counterfactuals,12 (ii) in underwriting various laws,13 (iii) in the 
confirmation of  a theory,14 and so on. I leave it to the reader to construct and evaluate arguments 
for compatibilism based on these further roles for Boltzmannian probabilities.
1.2 Deterministic chance in Bohmian mechanics
According to Bohmian mechanics, the fundamental laws are Schrodinger’s equation and the 
guidance equation. Taken together, these laws are deterministic. Given a complete specification 
of  the initial state of  a quantum system (i.e. given a complete specification of  the initial position 
of  each particle in the system and the initial wavefunction of  the system), these laws allow us to 
predict the behavior of  that system at all other times.
Standard approaches to Bohmian mechanics15 add a probabilistic postulate to 
Schrodinger’s equation and the guidance equation. For C an arbitrary region of  configuration 
space, and c an arbitrary subregion of  C, the postulate says:
Bohmian statistical postulate. The probability that a system starts off  in c, given that it 
starts off  in C, is just the measure (on the standard quantum measure) of  the 
points within C that are also within c. 
Where the standard quantum measure for a system that has initial wave function ψ  is given by 
ψ 2 .
The Bohmian statistical postulate allows us to predict the exact configuration of  the 
particles in a quantum system based on less specific information about the configuration of  those 
particles and the wavefunction of  that system. Consider, for instance, a single particle that starts 
off  located somewhere within region R and that has an initial wavefunction that is symmetric 
over the x-axis, which bisects R. It follows from the Bohmian statistical postulate that the 
probability that the particle starts off  located above the x-axis is 1/2. If  the initial wavefunction 
had instead been such that its amplitude was much higher above the x-axis than below the x-axis, 
then the probability that the particle started off  located above the x-axis would have been very 
high. 
12 See Albert 2000, 2011; Loewer 2007; Emery 2
13 See Loewer 2004 and Glynn 2010.
14 Ismael 2009 emphasizes the role that probabilities play in confirming deterministic theories.
15 See for instance Durr et al 1991, Albert 1992, and chapter 4d in the present volume.
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The Bohmian statistical postulate also allows us to predict and explain the behavior of  
quantum mechanical systems based on a less than complete specification of  the system’s initial 
state. Let C1 and C2 be arbitrary regions of  configuration space. It follows from the Bohmian 
statistical postulate that the probability that a system that starts in C1 at t1 will evolve into C2 at 
t2 is just the measure (on the standard quantum measure at t1) of  the points in C1 that evolve 
into C2 according to the fundamental dynamical laws.
But of  particular importance is the fact that the Bohmian statistical postulate allows us to 
predict the data that in the standard quantum mechanical formalism is predicted by Born’s Rule.
Born’s Rule. The probability that a system with wave function ψ  at t will be found 
in configuration c if  we perform a measurement on it at t is given by ψ (c) 2 .
This is because the fundamental dynamical laws of  Bohmian mechanics are such that if  the 
probability that a system will be found in some configuration c at some time to is ψ to (c)
2 , then for 
all t, the probability that a system will be found in c is ψ t (c)
2 . It follows from this fact, combined 
with the Bohmian statistical postulate, that the relative frequencies of  the outcomes of  various 
experiments will match the probabilities given by Born’s rule.
As with the probabilities in Boltzmannian’s rule, it is tempting to try to construct an 
argument for compatibilism just based on the role that the Bohmian statistical postulate play in 
generating these sorts of  predictions. Such an argument would look like this:
7 According to Bohmian mechanics, non-trivial probabilities determine what we 
ought to expect to happen.
8 In order to determine what we ought to expect to happen, the probabilities in 
question must be objective.
But once again, one needs to tread carefully. Although premise 7 is uncontroversial, insofar as we 
adopt the understanding of  ‘objective’ outlined in the introduction, there is no reason to endorse 
premise 8. Rational credences can determine what we ought to expect, and on that 
understanding of  ‘objective’, rational credences are not genuinely objective probabilities.
For this reason, it is important that one also consider the role that the Bohmian statistical 
postulate plays in explaining the behavior of  quantum mechanical systems. Insofar as one just 
considers the fundamental laws of  Bohmian mechanics, the utility of  Born’s rule is surprising. 
There are initial arrangements of  particles that, when combined with the fundamental laws, lead 
to configurations to which Born’s rule assigns very low probability. But we rarely see such 
configurations. Why not? The Bohmian statistical postulate provides us with a straightforward 
answer to this question: we rarely see such configurations because, although they are possible, 
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they are unlikely. 
This further explanatory role for the probabilities in the Bohmian statistical postulate 
gives rise to the following argument for compatibilism:
9 According to Bohmian mechanics, non-trivial probabilities explain the behavior of  
quantum mechanical systems.
10 In order to explain the behavior of  quantum mechanical systems, the probabilities 
in question must be objective.
Here premise 10 is uncontroversial. As for premise 9, it is not entirely clear that it is standard 
scientific practice to use probabilities to explain frequencies in Bohmian mechanics, if  only 
because few practicing physicists endorse Bohmian mechanics and few physics texts discuss the 
theory in detail. Nonetheless this premise presumably inherits some plausibility from the very 
same arguments that can be mustered to support premise 5 above. Insofar as this sort of  
probabilistic explanation is legitimate—and preferable to alternatives—in statistical mechanics, 
presumably the same is true in Bohmian mechanics.
As was discussed with respect to Boltzmannian probabilities, there are also other roles that 
the probabilities in the Bohmian statistical postulate are supposed to play and that are plausibly 
such that any probabilities that play that role must be wholly objective. These include the roles 
that Bohmian probabilities may play in determining the truth (or assertibility) conditions of  
counterfactuals, in confirming the theory, and so on. But once again, I leave it to the reader to 
investigate those further arguments in detail.
1.3 Arguments from the irrelevance of  the fundamental laws
A somewhat different type of  argument for compatibilism that is worth discussing here starts 
from the observation that non-trivial probabilities play a certain role whether or not the underlying 
laws are deterministic, and then continues by claiming that in order to play that role the relevant 
probabilities must be objective. This sort of  argument is sometimes put forward with respect to 
various roles that probabilities play in evolutionary theory (Sober 2010), but is also often put 
forward with respect to the roles that probabilities play in more prosaic contexts, like various 
kinds of  gambling set-ups (Handfield and Wilson 2011). 
I mention these arguments here mainly to point out the ways in which the very same 
considerations that were discussed in sections 1.1 and 1.2 will bear on these arguments. Along 
these lines it is worth nothing that the most obvious ways to construct such an argument will 
appeal to the roles that such probabilities play in prediction or explanation. So it seems plausible 
that the very same sorts of  motivations and concerns that motivate the introduction of  
deterministic chance in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics will be 
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relevant here.
In addition notice that in the case of  gambling set-ups, at least, the relevant deterministic 
chances can also be derived by placing a relative natural measure over the space of  possible initial 
states of  the system and interpreting that measure as a probability measure. For instance, for a 
fair coin, initial conditions that lead to heads and initial conditions that lead to tails are relatively 
evenly distributed throughout the state space and within any non-gerrymandered region of  that 
space, roughly half  of  the possible initial conditions will be such that they lead to the coin landing 
heads.16 It follows that insofar as you put a relatively natural measure over the space of  possible 
initial conditions and interpret that measure as a probability measure, the probability of  a fair 
coin landing heads will be 1/2. So it seems plausible that any metaphysical analysis of  
deterministic chance that is able to handle the chances in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and 
Bohmian mechanics will also be able to handle chances insofar as they arise in various gambling 
set-ups.
2 Two worries about deterministic chance
Now that we have a sense of  the arguments that motivate compatibilism, we can address two 
common worries about deterministic chance. The first is a worry about whether we can 
understand deterministic chance in terms of  any of  the familiar metaphysical analyses of  chance. 
The second is whether deterministic chance violates some sort of  platitude about the chance 
concept. 
2.1 Metaphysical analyses of  deterministic chance
Can we give an analysis of  deterministic chance in terms that are familiar from the debate over 
the metaphysics of  chance in general? If  not, advocates of  deterministic chance may be required 
to give either a novel or a disjunctive account of  chance (according to which deterministic 
chances are distinctively different sorts of  entities from other chances).17 Perhaps an account of  
one of  those two types is ultimately necessary, but at the very least it would be a significant cost.18 
Luckily for compatibilists, though, it looks as though deterministic chances as discussed in section 
1 can be accommodated by several of  the leading contenders for metaphysical theories of  
chance.
16 As discussed in chapter 11b in the present volume this observation was originally due to Poincare.
17 As an example of  a metaphysical analysis of  deterministic chance which is not obviously amenable to also 
handling indeterministic chance, and thus gives rise to a disjunctive account of  chance as a whole, see Strevens 1999, 
2013. Further discussion can also be found in chapter 11b of  this volume. 
18 Not everyone cares about these costs. For instance Strevens’s (2011) microconstant chance is an analysis of  
deterministic chance that makes such chances distinct from indeterministic chance.
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Perhaps most obviously, deterministic chances can be easily accommodated insofar as one 
adopts some kind of  frequency analyses of  chance.19 In particular, consider an actual frequency 
analysis of  chance, according to which the chance of  event of  type E is just the actual relative 
frequency with which events of  type E actually occur. In order to give this sort of  analysis of  
deterministic chances as they arise in, for instance, Boltzmannian statistical mechanics one need 
merely establish that the actual relative frequency with which the events described in the 
Boltzmannian statistical postulate is given by the Liouville measure over the relevant region of  
phase space.
The actual frequency analysis of  chance, of  course, faces many objections.20 One worry 
that might seems especially pressing in the present context is that such an analysis robs chances 
of  their explanatory role. Insofar as chances just are relative frequencies, they cannot explain 
those relative frequencies; after all, nothing can explain itself. This seems especially worrisome 
since the explanatory role played by the probabilities in, e.g. the Boltzmannian statistical 
postulate, was a key reason for thinking those probabilities were genuine chances.
It is not clear, however, that this worry about the explanatory power of  actual frequentist 
accounts of  chance in general is much of  a worry for actual frequentist accounts of  deterministic 
chance. It depends, in particular, on what sorts of  relative frequencies we are trying to explain. 
Insofar as one is a frequentist one cannot, for instance, use the Boltzmannian statistical postulate 
to explain the relative frequency with which systems that start off  in some region of  phase space 
R also start off  in some subregion r. To do so would be to use one and the same fact to explain 
itself. But one can use the Boltzmannian statistical postulate to explain the relative frequency with 
which systems that start off  in R1 at t1 evolve into R2 at t2. In that case the explanandum and 
the explanans (which will appeal to the relative frequency within which systems that start off  R1 
start off  in some particular subregion of  R1) are distinct. 
A different sort of  worry that arises for an actual frequentist analysis of  deterministic 
chance is that such an analysis seems unsuited to theories like Boltzmannian statistical mechanics 
or Bohmian mechanics insofar as those theories are supposed to describe the evolution of  the 
universe as a whole. In order for an actual frequentist to make sense of  the Boltzmannian and 
Bohmian statistical postulate as applied to the universe as a whole, they would need to make 
sense of  a probability distribution over the initial state of  the universe in terms of  the actual 
relative frequency with which the universe starts off  in various initial conditions. But on a natural 
way of  thinking, there is just a single universe and the universe has a single initial state. So the 
actual relative frequency with which the universe starts off  in any particular initial condition is 
either 0 or 1.
In response to this worry frequentists have two options. First they can focus solely on 
relatively closed sub-systems of  the universe, like everyday statistical mechanical systems and 
19 For more on frequency interpretations of  chance see chapter 11b in this volume. 
20 See Hajek 1997 and chapter 11b in this volume.
11
gambling devices. Insofar as one restricts ones interest to such systems, one need not make sense 
of  the actual relative frequency of  various initial conditions of  the universe, only of  the actual 
relative frequency of  various initial conditions of  these isolated systems. Second, they can insist 
that what is meant by ‘the universe’ in theories that describe the evolution of  the universe as a 
whole is not everything that there is (and was and will be). Perhaps, for instance, the universe is 
just one of  many closed systems, as in some contemporary multi-verse or “bubble universe” 
views. Such a view would leave room for the relative frequency with which universes start in a 
certain kind of  initial condition to be between 0 and 1.
A second prominent metaphysical analysis of  chance is the best systems analysis, according 
to which chances are those probability distributions that appear in the best way of  systematizing 
the occurrent (non-modal, non-dispositional, non-casual) facts about the world.21 What exactly 
makes one way of  systematizing the world better than another varies, depending on which 
version of  the best systems analysis you consider. But in general the introduction of  various 
probability distributions potentially provides a significant advantage in terms of  informativeness22 
with little cost in terms of  complexity.
Perhaps the best known analysis along these lines is due to Albert and Loewer.23 
According to their view—which they call the mentaculus—probabilistic postulates like the 
Boltzmannian or Bohmian statistical postulates derive from a single probability distribution over 
the possible initial states of  the universe. In Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, for instance, the 
probability distribution is given by Liouville measure over the  region of  the initial state space of  
the universe that corresponds to the universe having very low entropy. They then argue that the 
best systemization of  the occurrent facts about the world includes both the fundamental 
dynamical laws and this initial probability distribution. It follows, given a best systems analysis, 
that the probability distribution in question is a genuine chance distribution.24 
The best systems analysis has no trouble making sense of  a probability distribution over 
the initial state of  the universe. It does, however, face worries about the explanatory power of  
chances. On Albert and Loewer’s account, for instance, the relative frequency of, for instance, 
anti-entropic behavior plays a role in making the probability distribution over the initial state of  
the universe a part of  the best systematization. Is it legitimate to also claim that the probability 
distribution over the initial state explains anti-entropic behavior? This is a difficult philosophical 
question which has seen significant recent attention in the context of  the best systems analysis of  
21 See Lewis 1994. 
22 Specifically adding the right probability distribution can provide a significant advantage in terms of  what Lewis 
(1994) called fit—the extent to which the theory assigns high probability to events that do happen and low probability 
to events that do not.
23 See Albert 2000, 2011; Loewer 2004, 2009, 2012. 
24 Important criticisms of  this approach include those found in Elga 2001, Frigg 2008, Frisch 2010, and Meacham 
2011. Other versions of  a BSA analysis of  deterministic chance are found in Callender and Cohen 2009, Hoefer 
2007 and Frigg and Hoefer 2015. This sort of  view is also discussed in Maudlin 2007a, section 2.
12
laws.25 
Finally, consider propensity analyses of  chance, according to which the chance of  a 
system in S1 at t1 evolving into S2 at t2 is given by the propensity (or tendency, or causal 
disposition) of  systems in S1 evolving into S2 over the specified time interval.26 Is it possible to 
give a propensity analysis of  deterministic chance? 
At first glance, it seems not. After all, propensities are diachronic and the chances that 
arise in the Boltzmannian and Bohmian statistical postulates are synchronic chances. But there is 
at least one clever way of  understanding deterministic chances as diachronic, and thus leaving 
room for a propensity analysis—an approach found in Demarest 2016. Demarest agrees with 
Albert and Loewer about the structure of  deterministic chance—all deterministic chances 
ultimately derive from a probability distribution over the possible initial state of  the universe. But 
she disagrees with Albert and Loewer’s analysis of  that initial probability distribution as a chance 
distribution deriving from the best system. Instead Demarest thinks that the initial probability 
distribution is determined by a single chance event which brought the initial state into existence. 
This view is straightforwardly amenable to a propensity analysis of  chance.
It should be clear, then, that there are options available for understanding deterministic 
chance that are in keeping with several of  the leading metaphysical analyses of  chance. These 
various analyses of  deterministic chance may come with various costs, and substantive further 
philosophical work is required in order to establish their ultimate viability. But there seems little 
reason to think that advocates of  deterministic chance will be required to give a novel or 
disjunctive account of  chance. 
2.2 Deterministic chance and the chance platitudes
Some philosophers claim that deterministic chance violates important platitudes about the 
chance concept. I don’t have space to go into all of  the arguments of  this form in detail, but here 
is one example that illustrates the sort of  considerations at stake. 
Consider the fact that there appears to be an important connection between chance and 
possibility along the following lines: if  there is a non-trivial chance of  something happening, it 
must be possible for that thing to happen and possible for it not to happen. If  there is a 1/2 
chance of  Classic Empire winning the Kentucky Derby, for instance, it must be possible for 
Classic Empire to win and possible for him not to win.
Here is one way of  capturing that platitude:
The chance-possibility platitude—incompatibilist’s version. If  the chance, at world w, at time t, of  
proposition p is greater than zero, then there exists a world w' such that (i) w' matches w in 
25 See Maudlin 2007b, Loewer 2012, and Lange 2013.
26 For more on propensity analyses of  chance see chapter 11b in this volume. 
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laws, (ii) w' and w have the same micro-physical history up until time t, and (iii) p is true at 
w'.27
It follows straightforwardly from this version of  the chance-possibility platitude that there are no 
non-trivial chances in worlds where the fundamental laws are deterministic. If  the chance of  
some proposition p is non-trivial, then the chance of  p is greater than zero and the chance of  ~p 
is greater than zero. But if  the laws of  world w are deterministic then the micro-physical history 
up until time t and the laws either determine that p is true or determine that p is not true. If  they 
determine that p is true, then every world w’ that matches w in the law and in its microphysical 
history is a world in which p is true, and it follows that the chance of  ~p is not greater than zero. 
If  they determine that p is not true, then every world w’ that matches w in the law and in its 
microphysical history is a world in which ~p is true, and it follows the chance of  p is not greater 
than zero. Either way, the chance of  p is not non-trivial.
The important thing to notice, however, is that the incompatibilist’s version of  the 
chance-possibility platitude is not the only version. The compatibilist who thinks that there are 
chances in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, for instance, cannot adopt the incompatibilist’s 
version of  the chance-possibility platitude. But she can adopt the following version:  
The chance-possibility platitude—BSM compatibilist’s version
If  the chance, at world w, at time t, of  proposition p is greater than zero, then there exists 
a world w' such that (i) w' matches w in laws, (ii) w' and w have the same macro-physical 
history up until time t, and (iii) p is true at w'.
Similarly, the compatibilist who thinks that there are chances in Bohmian mechanics cannot 
adopt the incompatibilist’s version of  the chance-possibility platitude. But she can adopt the 
following version:  
The chance-possibility platitude—BM compatibilist’s version
If  the chance, at world w, at time t, of  proposition p is greater than zero, then there exists 
a world w' such that (i) w' matches w in laws, (ii) w' and w have the same wavefunction up 
until time t, and (iii) p is true at w'.
The challenge for anyone who wants to insist that deterministic chances are not genuine chances 
is to argue for the incompatibilist’s version of  the chance-possibility platitude over these 
alternative versions. At the very least, though, there is room for the compatibilist to claim that 
27 This principle is called the realization principle in Schaffer 2007. It’s a stronger version of  the basic chance 
principle found in Bigelow et al. 1993.
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they have retained at least some aspect of  the platitude in question.28
Similar points can be made regarding the supposed incompatibility of  deterministic 
chance and the standard way of  thinking about the connection between chance and credence 
(the principal principle)29 and regarding the standard way of  thinking about the connection between 
chance and laws.30
Here is a related worry that, while rarely made explicit in the literature, may be playing a 
significant role in motivating incompatibilism. It is very natural to think that the past is not 
chancy. That is to say, it is very natural to think that chance is always time-indexed, and for an 
arbitrary proposition p, if  t is in the past, then the chance at t of  p is either 0 or 1. But one 
consequence of  giving up various pre-theoretic platitudes about chance, like the incompatibilist’s 
version of  the chance-possibility platitude, is that you leave open the possibility of  non-trivial 
chances of  events in the past. Consider, for instance, the BSM-compatibilist’s version of  the 
chance-possibility platitude. This version leaves open the possibility that there will be non-trivial 
chance of  micro-physical events in the past. 
Insofar as this is going to be an objection to deterministic chance more must be done to 
argue that compatibilists should in fact accept non-trivial chances of  past events, not just that 
they might have to do so. But it is also worth pointing out that on a very standard view about 
philosophy of  time, and in particular on the sort of  view that appears to fit best with 
contemporary physics, there are no objective or fundamental differences between times that are 
past, and those that are not. So anyone who builds their defense of  incompatibilism on the claim 
that the past cannot be chancy (while the future may), has their work cut out for them not only in 
terms of  spelling out further details regarding the nature and commitments of  deterministic 
chance, but also in defending their view against the standard approach to philosophy of  time.31
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